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Financial Disclosure and Stock Price Volatility: Evidence from Portugal and Belgium 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to provide evidence on the determinants of reporting transparency and its 
impact on stock price volatility, analysing the disclosure practices of two European countries. 
We proxy for transparency by manually constructing two indexes scores for the sample firms. 
We assess the differences in disclosure practices between Portuguese firms and a matched 
sample of Belgian firms, applying a transparency and a volatility model. We find evidence 
that Portuguese firms are less transparent then the Belgian ones, concerning the subjects of 
ownership and governance. The results show that larger and more profitable firms are more 
transparent. For separate samples of Belgian and Portuguese firms, and based on annual 
reports information, we find no evidence of an association between transparency and price 
volatility. However, considering the quarterly reports, we find a negative relation between 
these variables for the second quarter, suggesting that the higher the transparency, the lower 
the stock price volatility. Analysing two small European countries with relative lack of 
research contributes to the recent literature on the information transparency investigating 
economic consequences of variations in disclosure (stock price volatility). 
 
Keywords: disclosure, transparency, stock price volatility, information asymmetry, 
accounting standards. 
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1. Introduction 
In a society depending on real time information, corporate disclosure is crucial for the capital 
market efficiency. The more disclosures a company makes, the more transparent becomes the 
information to investors, the lower becomes the information asymmetry and more credible the 
firms will be for the market, resulting in a stock price increase (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The 
transparency quality may also be assessed by the information provided by external quality 
auditors as well as by financial analysts. In addition, transparency strengthens both the foreign 
and the domestic investment, contributing also for an increase in the market liquidity and a 
decrease in the cost of capital.  
In this context, we analyse the disclosure situation of Portuguese listed firms, matching with a 
sample of another European country, Belgium.  
The relevance of this paper is based on several reasons. First, it contributes to the recent 
literature on the information transparency and its impact on stock price volatility (e.g., Bushee 
and Noe, 2000; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Frutos and Manzano, 2005). Second, it can be of 
interest to both managers and investors, because of the influence of transparency on domestic 
and foreign investments. Finally, it analyses two European small markets, with relative lack 
of research. Both countries are characterized as civil law countries, having a lower quality of 
legal protection of investors than common law countries, such as the UK and the United 
States (La Porta et al., 1998; 2000). However, we believe that Belgian firms are more likely to 
be operating in a shareholder-oriented environment, where ownership is less concentrated and 
investors need a greater extent on information to make their investment decisions, while 
Portuguese firms are more likely to be operating in a stakeholder-oriented environment. In 
addition, the two countries have different requirements regarding the management report, 
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such as the social balance sheet. Consequently, the disclosure practices of the firms may 
differ. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review. Section three 
describes the methodology, the hypotheses and the data. Section four reports the empirical 
results and the robustness checks. Finally, section five concludes the paper.   
2. Previous Literature 
The literature suggests that financial transparency causes several benefits for firms. It is, for 
example, a means of reducing the cost of capital and increasing the market liquidity (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Lang and Maffett, 20101). Several authors found a negative relationship 
between the level of disclosure and the cost of capital (Klein and Bawa, 1976; Botosan, 1997; 
Barry and Brown, 1985; Handa and Linn, 1993; Coles et al., 1995; Clarkson et al., 1996) and 
a positive relation between market liquidity and the level of disclosure (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Seyoum 
(2009) concludes that companies that are not transparent are associated with more 
transactions cost then the transparent ones. Furthermore, Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998) 
and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found evidence of lower equity and debt costs in firms with 
higher levels of disclosure. Diamond (1985) finds that the cost of private information 
acquirement is reduced by information disclosure, concluding that the release of information 
brings a benefit and not a loss to shareholders. This assumption is justified by information 
cost savings and risk share, and subscribed by other authors, such as Collins and Salatka 
(1993), Kim (1993), Welker (1995) and Hail and Leuz (2009).  
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), analysing the German market, conclude that the information 
asymmetry declines with the level of disclosure increasing, and it is well documented that 
information asymmetry influences the market efficiency. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), 
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Verrecchia (2001) and Zhang (2001) find a negative relationship between the level of 
information asymmetry and the market efficiency.  
There is also the evidence of a negative relationship between firm disclosure and price 
volatility, which can be justified by several reasons. First, the information asymmetry 
decreases with more transparency, allowing stock price volatility smoothing. Second, if firms 
send regularly information to the market, the impact of new information about its 
performance will decrease, causing a lower variation on prices. Finally, with more 
transparency, the firms valuation will be more consensual for the investors, thus the volatility 
will be reduced. The idea that the quality of disclosure and transparency could diminish the 
firms’ stock price volatility can motivate companies to disclose more information. 
Coles et al. (1995) and Sengupta (1998), among many others, conclude that the expected 
return and risk decreases as the disclosure increases, causing a smooth in the stock price 
volatility. Lee and Chung (1998) analyse 54 small listed firms in the Korean Stock Market, 
for the period from 1991 to 1993, concluding that open limit order book reduces stock market 
volatility, which leads to a more efficient market, with fair prices. Bushee and Noe (2000) 
conclude that, in the US market, better disclosure gives a good signal to the market, removing 
the uncertainty caused by the non-liberation of information. Consequently, it results in a 
reduction of prices volatility. They document a higher volatility in small companies and 
justify it with a “corporate disclosure”. The authors conclude that the smooth behaviour on 
stock prices decreases the firms’ cost of capital. However, they demonstrate that the effect of 
disclosure on volatility is complex, and may depend on the type of investors attracted to the 
firm. Analysing the financial sector, from 1993 to 2000, Baumann and Nier (2004) found also 
a negative relationship between disclosure and volatility. 
Alves and Santos (2008) analyse earnings announcements, as well as the respective 
informativeness of quarterly financial reporting of Portuguese firms in the period from 1994 
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to 2004. Their results suggest that the first and third quarters information is also significantly 
related with price volatility and trading volume, suggesting informativeness of financial 
reporting for all the quarters.  
Ding et al. (2008) analyse the transparency of 63 firms of Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, and compared them with 58 firms from Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden), using two proxies of financial transparency. The main conclusion achieved in the 
comparison between the two regions is that Baltic countries have a lower level of financial 
transparency than the Nordic ones. The authors found a negative relationship between 
transparency and volatility for both measures in the Nordic countries, and for one of the 
measures in the Baltic sample. Thus, the authors conclude that Baltic investors are only 
interested in financial information, whereas in Nordic countries, investors give also relevance 
to information towards governance and ownership. Frutos and Manzano (2005) compare a 
transparent and an obscure market. They conclude that the opaque market presents more 
volatile prices and less price efficiency. 
The demand for ownership structure generates the need of quality accounting information 
(Ding et al., 2007). When the ownership structure is highly concentrated, there is less demand 
of information. Indeed, previous studies find a negative relationship between disclosure and 
ownership concentration (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Laidroo, 2009, among others).  
Transparency generates also benefits for the global economy. Foreign direct investment 
increases with the corporate transparency (Seyoum, 2009; Bhardwaj et al., 2007; Razin and 
Sadka, 2007). Based on the assumptions of the behavioural finance, Bradshaw et al. (2004) 
argue that the main cause of home bias is the inability of many foreign firms to attract the 
initial attention of investors, concluding that investors tend to spend their money in a larger 
amount of domestic equities, despite the payback of foreign equities. The inability to attract 
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foreign investors could be eliminated with more efforts to improve financial reporting 
practices (Ding et al., 2008). 
3. Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
In order to analyse the phenomenon of information transparency, we start to choose the 
proxies to measure transparency. After, we consider a transparency and a volatility model.  
3.1. Methodology and Hypotheses 
3.1.1. Disclosure indices 
The relation between transparency indices and disclosure is documented by Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) and Lang and Lundholm (1993). Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to measure the 
disclosure level because the application of the index could be slightly subjective and every 
item is not necessarily relevant to all firms. Raffournier (1995) stated that there is a 
framework of indices being no relevant.  
We decide to consider two indices extensively used in prior studies to measure transparency: 
Center for International Financial Analysis & Research (CIFAR), related with specific types 
of accounting policies, including, for example, items from the income and cash flow 
statements, as well as balance sheet, and the Standard & Poor’s (2002) Transparency & 
Disclosure index (S&P), which includes items of voluntary types of disclosure, such as 
information about the ownership structure and governance. Appendices A and B present the 
list of discretionary items considered in the CIFAR and S&P indices, respectively. 
To obtain the indices score, we analyse the information provided in firms’ annual financial 
reports2. The total points obtained by a specific firm are computed, for the two indices, by the 
following formulas:  
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The sums of SCOREci,j, measuring CIFAR, and SCOREsepi,j, measuring S&P, go through the 
total number of points awarded to the firm j for all the questions i, with i = 1...78 for CIFAR 
and i = 1...96 for S&P index.  
3.1.2. Transparency Model 
According prior literature, financial disclosure is positively related to several firm-specific 
variables, such as the size of the firm (King et al., 1990; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hope, 
2003; Taylor et al., 2008), profitability (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Armitage and Marston, 
2008), their auditors rating (Hope, 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Hope et al., 2008) and equity 
offer (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1997).  
Consequently, we formulate first hypothesis, in order to analyse whether transparency is 
dependent from firm-specific variables: 
H1: “The transparency score is positively associated with firm size, leverage, 
profitability, auditor and equity offer, and negatively associated with ownership.” 
The results concerning the relationship between transparency and leverage are not consensual. 
However, we hypothesized that leverage increases the firm’s transparency because these firms 
will be nearer to their creditors, having different ways of divulging social responsibility.  
To test the first hypothesis, we estimate the following ordinary least square (OLS) model: 
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where: 
Transparency = disclosure score based on one of two indices (CIFAR or S&P); 
Portugal = dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is 
Portuguese (PT) and zero otherwise; 
Size = logarithm of total assets; 
Leverage = ratio of total debt over total assets; 
Profitability = return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before 
extraordinary items divided by book value of equity, relative to the  
ROE of the industry; 
Auditor = dummy variable that take the value one if the company is audited 
by a Big 4 firm and zero otherwise; 
Equity Offer = dummy variable that take the value one if the company arranged 
an equity offer during 2008, and zero otherwise; 
Ownership = voting rights of the three biggest shareholders of the company; 
iµ  = Error term. 
We present a brief summary of the independent variables included in our regression model: 
Size 
The firm size is considered as one of the most important variables related with the level of 
transparency (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Several authors find evidence of a positive 
relationship between firm size and the release of information, such as Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), King et al. (1990), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Hope (2003) and Taylor et al. 
(2008), among others. Although size is measured in several different ways (for example, 
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considering the sales and the number of employees), we measure firm size as the logarithm of 
total assets to reduce the impact of skewed data in the statistical analysis. This measure of size 
is frequently used, such as in the studies of Allen and Rachim (1996), Ding et al. (2008), 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Taylor et al. (2008) and Cho et al. (2010). 
Leverage 
The results concerning the relationship between information disclosure and the firm leverage 
are not consensual. Some authors find a positive relationship between the two variables 
(Roberts, 1992; Choi, 1999; Purushotaman et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2008) and others found 
a negative relation (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). In contrast, 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) find no evidence of a significant relationship between leverage 
and disclosure and Roberts (1992) states that it depends on the degree the company relies on 
its debt financing. Thus, the signal of the leverage variable is ambiguous3. We measure 
leverage variable by the ratio of total debt/total assets, like in the studies of Belkaoui and 
Karpik (1989), Depoers (2000), Branco and Rodrigues (2008) and Ding et al. (2008), among 
others. 
Profitability 
Several studies document a positive relationship between the disclosure level and the firms 
profitability, such as Roberts (1992), Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Armitage and Marston 
(2008). The same conclusion was reached by Singhvi and Desai (1971), but only for the 
univariate test, because for the multivariate test, this determinant appears to be non-
significant. To measure this variable, we follow the work of Ding et al. (2008).  
Auditor 
The audits indicator is a measure of the reliability of financial accounting disclosures 
(Bushman et al., 2004). Consequently, we expect that the better the quality of audits, the 
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higher the transparency of the firm. Following previous studies (Hope, 2003; Ding et al., 
2008; Hope et al., 2008; Bushman et al., 2004), we use the “Big 4” proxy to measure the 
audit quality. 
Equity Offer 
The extant literature generally suggests that firms with equity offers have more incentive to 
disclose information than the firms without them. According Healy and Palepu (1993), 
managers with the concern of equity are aware that is very important to the issuer to create a 
good feeling in the investors. The level of disclosure could be seen as a firm’s forward 
scenario, concerning equity and debt offers or even the acquisition of another company in a 
stock market operation. Lang and Lundholm (1997) document a significant increase in 
disclosure by the firms on the six months before an equity offer, particularly when managers 
have issues needing some discretion.  
Ownership 
We include also the ownership variable because we think it might be relevant to explain 
transparency, because when ownership is highly concentrated, there is less demand of 
information (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Ding et al., 2007; Laidroo, 2009).  
3.1.3. Volatility Model 
In order to relate transparency and volatility, we formulate the second hypothesis: 
H2: “Transparency scores are negatively associated with stock price volatility.” 
We expect that the higher the transparency level, the lower the information asymmetry, 
allowing stock price volatility to reduce. If firms convey information to the market frequently, 
the impact of new information about its performance will decrease, causing a lower variation 
on prices. As disclosure increases, the firm’s risk decreases, causing a smooth in the stock 
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price volatility (Coles et al., 1995; Sengupta, 1998; Lee and Chung, 1998; Bushee and Noe, 
2000). 
We examine whether transparency and stock price volatility are related with each other, 
considering, in addition, a set of control variables. The volatility model is formulated as 
follows:  
isIndFeffectDYieldMB
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where: 
Volatility = standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week share 
prices (annual volatility); 
MB = end-of-the-year capitalization divided by book value of total common 
equity; 
DYield = dividend yield , computed as dividend per share divided by year-end 
stock price; 
IndFeffects = fixed effects for eight industry sectors; 
iµ  = Error term. 
The other variables have already been defined. 
Next, we present a brief summary of the control variables, not yet referred: 
Market-to-Book 
Stock price volatility is influenced by the market-to-book ratio (MB), used as a proxy for 
growth predictions, which is associated with higher future volatility (Fama and French, 1992; 
La Porta et al., 1997; Berkman et al., 2002). The expected signal for this coefficient is 
positive. However, Ding et al. (2008) find ambiguous results.  
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Dividend Yield 
Previous studies finds out a negative relationship between Dividend Yield and stock price 
volatility, such as the one of Allen and Rachim (1996). The higher is the dividend yield, the 
lower is the risk. Consequently, the expected sign for this variable is negative. However, other 
studies find no evidence of a significant value for the coefficient on dividend payout, such as 
the study of Baumann and Nier (2004) and Ding et al. (2008). 
In what concerns the relationship between the information conveyed to the market through the 
financial reports and the volatility, we must be aware that, in the assumption of the market 
efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1970), when the financial reports are published, the market 
knows already the information. Consequently, the share price is not adjusted, because it was 
already been adjusted. 
3.2. The Sample 
We analyse the transparency of the Portuguese market4, using a sample of non-financial listed 
firms on the Euronext Lisbon (EL). We exclude financial firms because those companies 
should comply with strict legal requirements regarding their finance (Gaud et al., 2003). The 
data was collected on the 2008 annual reports, from the firm’s websites. When some kind of 
information was not found, we obtain the data from the website of the Portuguese committee 
of the securities market (CMVM), or Amadeus database. The Portuguese final sample 
consists of 45 non-financial firms (of the 56 listed on EL).  
The Portuguese sample is matched with a Belgian sample, considering the firms industry and 
size. This Belgium choice for the matching is justified for several reasons. First, the presence 
of both countries in Euronext are associated with similar accounting standards, namely after 
the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, and it allow us to 
control for the possibility that disclosure differences may be related to the quotation and 
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trading requirements of their capital market. Second, regulation and corporate governance are 
similar in both markets, what is explained by the spread of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) rules. Finally, the fact that the Belgian and Portuguese stock exchange 
markets are relatively small is an opportunity for good matching relations between them.  
Although both countries are characterized as civil law countries, having a lower quality of 
legal protection of investors than common law countries (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000), the 
firms’ financial reporting and disclosure practices may deviate due to variations in market 
demand and other institutional characteristics. Disclosure of firms from shareholder 
environments tends to be more transparent (Ball et al., 2000), which is the case of Belgium, 
compared to Portugal. 
The non-financial listed firms on Euronext Brussels (EB) amounts to 171. To create a 
proportion between the two markets, we use the matching method. After removing the firms 
simultaneously listed on other stock Exchanges, the sample was grouped according the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). Finally, it is obtained the Belgian matched sample, 
according the size of the companies. Four of the Belgian firms were used twice as a matching 
pair for some of the Portuguese firms because of the lack of Belgian companies, namely in 
what concerns the industry and size criteria.  
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the disclosure indices for the Portuguese and the 
Belgian samples. For Portugal, the CIFAR index mean is 56.2, whereas for Belgium it 
presents a value of 54.5. In what concerns the S&P index, the higher mean is for Belgium, 
with a score of 58, whereas the Portuguese mean score is of 57.5. A better mean score for 
CIFAR in Portugal and for S&P in Belgium suggests that there are different ranges in 
transparency. In what concerns the maximum values, we can see that, for the CIFAR index, 
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the most transparent firm are from Portugal (scored with 66), but concerning S&P index the 
better score (79) comes from a Belgian company.  
(Table 1) 
The results suggest that Portuguese firms are more focuses on the spread of their accounting 
policies and Belgian firms are more concerned with ownership and governance disclosure. 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between CIFAR and S&P indices for the 
Portuguese and Belgian markets. Considering both countries, the correlation between the two 
indices is of about 43%, significant at 1% level. For the Portuguese market, the correlation 
between the transparency indices is relatively high (approximately 49%), and statically 
significant at 1% level, being a good sign that transparency is explained by these factors. 
However, for the Belgian market, the result is lower (38% approximately), what could be a 
concern. Ding et al. (2008) found correlation of 72.7% and 60.6%, respectively for the Baltic 
and Nordic markets, which denote that, for these countries, the indices are more likely to 
measuring transparency. 
(Table 2) 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for our study (Panel A) 
as well as for the Ding et al. (2008) study, in order to compare values. Portuguese and Belgian 
firms’ size are quite similar, being the size mean of 8.61 and 8.49, respectively. However, 
Portuguese firms have more leverage (0.74) than the Belgian ones (0.47). In what concerns 
the profitability, and considering the two markets together, the profitability is negative, with a 
significant number of companies presenting a negative value for earnings before extraordinary 
items. Indeed, 2008 was a financial and economy crisis year. However, considering the two 
samples separately, Portuguese firms seem to be more profitable than the Belgian ones, which 
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are curious, since we expect that Portugal was equally, if not more, affected by the crisis, than 
Belgium. 
The Belgian sample has a higher percentage of firms audited by one of the BIG 4 (77.78%) 
than the Portuguese sample (73.33%). Furthermore, equity offer was an absent and rare event, 
respective by the Portuguese and the Belgian sample (2%). Finally, both Portuguese and 
Belgian firms present a high level of ownership concentration with a Belgian mean of 60.3% 
and a Portuguese mean of 64%. 
(Table 3) 
Comparing these results with the ones of Ding et al. (2008), in Panel B, it is observed that, 
globally, both the Baltic and the Nordic firms’ present higher size, have lower leverage, 
higher profitability, higher percentage of auditors from BIG 4, and similar number of equity 
offers. The exception is the fact that Nordic firms have a lower level of ownership 
concentration (about 47.68%). 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the transparency indices, the Portuguese 
coefficient and the control variables. Both the CIFAR and S&P indices present a non 
significant correlation with PT. Disclosure correlates positively and significantly with the firm 
size and the auditor quality. In what concerns the correlation coefficients among the control 
variables, the results show a positive and significant correlation between SIZE and both 
AUDITOR and EQUITY OFFER, as well as a positive correlation between 
PROFITABILITY and OWNERSHIP, at 5% level. However, these coefficients are not very 
high (always below 50%), so it does not appear to be sufficiently large to cause concern about 
multicollinearity problems. All the other coefficients present not statistically significance. 
(Table 4) 
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Table 5 reports the results of the OLS transparency regression model [3], analysing the 
relation between disclosure levels (measured by the CIFAR and S&P indices) and the firm-
specific variables. We correct for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method.  
The coefficients that explain transparency, considering both the CIFAR and the S&P indices 
are the firm SIZE, PROFITABILITY and EQUITY OFFER, all of them with the expected 
signal (positive), except the EQUITY OFFER, in the S&P case. Ding et al. (2008) find also a 
negative value for this coefficient in the S&P measure, however, close to zero.  
(Table 5) 
Regarding the SIZE of the firm, it could be seen that bigger firms will have better scores of 
transparency. Size will generate an increase in the CIFAR score of about 1.91, and 4.47 on the 
S&P index. Although the coefficient on PROFITABILITY is not economically significant, it 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. The evidence of a positive relationship between 
disclosure level and the firms’ profitability, suggests that managers may be more motivated to 
disclosure information when profitability is high.  
Globally, these results suggest that firms that present higher level of transparency tend to 
present larger size and higher profitability, which is consistent with the results of Singhvi and 
Desai (1971), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), Ding et al. (2008) 
and Cho et al. (2010).  
Consequently, we find evidence supporting hypothesis one (H1), in what concerns the firm-
specific variables SIZE and PROFITABILITY and some evidence for the coefficient 
EQUITY OFFER. 
Comparing the adjusted R2, we can see that transparency is better explained by the S&P 
measure than by the CIFAR (13.4% versus 8.9%, respectively). However, it seems that for 
both cases the regressions are not strong enough to explain the transparency. 
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The PT dummy is positive for CIFAR index and negative for S&P index, suggesting that 
Portuguese firms are more transparent than the Belgian ones in the accounting policies 
(CIFAR) and that the Belgian firms have a higher level of transparency than the Portuguese 
ones in what concerns the ownership and the governance features (S&P), which is in 
agreement with the results shown in Table 1. Although the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, they seem to be economically relevant. This evidence is in accordance with the 
assumption that in a shareholder oriented environment (the case of Belgium), the demand for 
better information transparency is strong in the area of ownership structure and corporate 
governance (La Porta et al., 1998). Consistently, Ding et al. (2008) find evidence that Baltic 
firms are less transparent then the Nordic ones, concerning the subjects of ownership and 
governance (S&P index).  
In order to analyse the relationship between stock price volatility and the disclosure 
(TRANSPARENCY), we run volatility model [4]. Table 6 shows the results. We are 
interested in how Portuguese and Belgian markets react, respectively, to firms’ financial 
transparency, thus, we run separate regressions for Portuguese (Panel A) and Belgian (Panel 
B) firms. Two models are computed, one using the CIFAR and the other using the S&P index. 
The models consider the industry fixed effects that control the volatility changes due to the 
type of industry.  
(Table 6) 
For the Portuguese sample, the only variable that contributes to explain the stock price 
volatility is the SIZE, in a positive way, and for both indices (CIFAR and S&P), which is 
consistent with the results of Fama and French (1992), Allen and Rachim (1996), Baumann 
and Nier (2004) and Ding et al. (2008), for the Nordic sample. Beyond the size influence, 
Ding et al. (2008) find some evidence that profitability affects positively the stock price 
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volatility. The non significant coefficient leads to the conclusion that in Portugal the stock 
prices volatility is not influenced by the financial transparency. 
In what concerns the Belgian sample, we can see that none of the coefficient presents a 
statistically significant value, thus, individually, none of these variables can explain the stock 
price volatility5.  
The evidence that TRANSPARENCY is not statistically significant, suggests that CIFAR and 
S&P indices are not good measures to explain the stock prices volatility.  
Overall, the results do not give support for the hypothesis that transparency scores are 
negatively associated with the stock prices volatility (H2), contrary to the results of Ding et al. 
(2008), but only for the S&P index.  
Because we only use annual reports, it might be possible that it does not necessarily capture 
all aspects of firms’ disclosure practices, which motivate to do robustness tests, in order to 
obvious this limitation.  
Robustness Tests  
After analysing the Table 6 results, we set a new possibility for understanding transparency. 
We make use of annual reports to determine the transparency and the variable employed to 
measure transparency stood quite unfitted to stock price volatility. However, concerning the 
study of the sensitivity of the stock price, it is more suitable to increase the frequency of 
disclosure, such as the reliable information of quarterly reports. Several authors use the 
quarterly reports as a proxy of disclosure, such as Lang and Lundholm (1993), Healy et al. 
(1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Alves and Santos (2008). Thus, for robustness 
reasons, we analyse the effect of quarterly reports on stock price volatility, considering a 
model of volatility similar to the model [4], formulated as follows: 
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where: 
TranspT1 = CIFAR-based index with the use of first Quarterly Report; 
TranspS1 = CIFAR-based index with the use of first Half-Year Report; 
TranspT3 = CIFAR-based index with the use of third Quarterly Report; 
TranspA = CIFAR-based index with the use of Annual Report. 
We apply this model to the Portuguese sample (the base of our study), and to the CIFAR 
index. The number of firms is now reduced from 45 to 42, because the lack of data. 
Table 7 presents the results. Comparing these results with the ones of Table 6, this model 
presents a greater explanatory power than the previous one (the adjusted R2 is about 0.39, 
against 0.27 in Table 6). 
(Table 7) 
In what concerns the transparency measures, only the half-year report (TRANSPS1) is 
statistical significant, at the 5% level.  The results are not consistent with the ones of Alves 
and Santos (2008), for the same market. They found a significant relationship between the 
first and the third quarterly reports and the stock price volatility. This difference in results 
could be explained by the methodology chosen (they analyse press release announcements of 
legally required information concerning the financial statements), as well as the different 
period analysed. 
Regarding the control variables, the results show that stock price volatility can be positively 
explained by SIZE and MB, and negatively by the DIVIDEND YIELD, having all the 
significant coefficients the expected signal. Comparing with the results of Table 6, we can see 
that, considering the quarterly information, stock price volatility is explained by more 
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variables. In addition, we find evidence that the change in CIFAR score is higher for the 
quarterly reports than for the annual reports. With this additional test, we find evidence of a 
negative relationship between transparency and the stock price volatility, for the second 
quarter, which is in agreement with Lee and Chung (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000) and 
Baumann and Nier (2004), among others. These results suggest a possibility of a relationship 
between transparency and volatility, with some lags. 
 
Concluding, in the Portuguese market, it seems that transparency does not influence the 
investment decisions. The lack of reaction in presence of transparency could indicate some 
passiveness of investors, in the presence of new information. It seems that investors do not 
understand the information conveyed to the market or maybe the information was already 
known before the report’s release. 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence on the determinants of information disclosure and the 
effects of disclosure on stock price volatility for Portuguese and Belgian stock markets, using 
a sample of non-financial listed firms in these two markets. 
The transparency, based on the disclosure on the annual reports, was measured by two 
indices: the CIFAR and the S&P indices. Portugal presents better scores for CIFAR based 
index and Belgium for S&P based index, which suggests that Portuguese firms are more 
concerned about disclosure from the regulation of accounting and Belgian firms are more 
transparent in terms of ownership structure.  
We find a significant relationship between disclosure and firm SIZE, PROFITABILITY and 
EQUITY OFFER, giving some support to hypothesis one. This result is in agreement with the 
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ones of Lang and Lundholm (1997), Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and 
Ding et al. (2008), among others. 
When we analyse the relationship between transparency and the stock price volatility, and 
considering the annual reports, we find no statistical significance between the two 
transparency measures (CIFAR and S&P) and volatility. Consequently, we find no evidence 
supporting hypothesis two. For the Portuguese sample, only the firm SIZE seems to be 
significantly related with the volatility, suggesting that stock prices volatility increases with 
the size of the companies. 
For robustness reasons, we analyse also the quarterly announcements, as the quarterly 
information gives more detailed information across the year, what could improve the 
empirical results related with stock price volatility. Applying the respective model to the 
Portuguese sample, we find evidence of a negative relationship between transparency and the 
stock price volatility, for the second quarter, suggesting that this release of information is 
quite important for investors. These results are in agreement with the ones of Lee and Chung 
(1998), Bushee and Noe (2000) and Baumann and Nier (2004), among others.  
Empirical evidence that stock price volatility may reduce in firms with better financial 
transparency, can be used by market regulators as an argument to persuade listed firms to 
adopt better disclosure practices. In addition, the study can be useful to both managers and 
investors, because higher levels of transparency attract foreign investment, allocate capital 
more efficiently, and foster economic growth (Ding et al., 2008). 
This study might have several limitations. First, we can have a potential problem of 
endogeneity, because the sampling is performed cross-sectionally at a single point in time 
(2008). Second, it is conducted in the financial crisis of 2008, which can result in biased 
conclusions. However, Ding et al. (2008) conducted a similar study for the Baltic region, in a 
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period of market growth (the year of 2004) and find similar results, which give some 
reliability to our main conclusions. Third, correlated omitted variables are also a potential 
problem in this paper, namely the institutional investors that are not included in the analysis 
may drive both transparency and volatility.  Finally, volatility is likely to be a poor proxy of 
information asymmetry. According the market efficiency hypothesis, the share price reacts 
when the information is conveyed to the market for the first time. Consequently, when the 
financial reports are published, the share price was already been adjusted, because the market 
knows previously the information. 
For future research, and in order to obvious some of caveats of this study, we would like to 
consider the following steps: extend the sample period, consider other European countries, 
create a single transparency measure and add trading volume as an additional proxy for 
information asymmetry. In addition, we would like to use press news rather than financial 
reports to relate to volatility (Alves and Santos, 2008). Moreover, there is potential interest for 
additional study on the specific aspects of transparency and crisis periods, which affect 
liquidity risk (Lang and Maffett, 2010). 
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Appendix A: List of Discretionary Items considered in CIFAR-based Index 
A: General information 
1-Address/Telephone/Fax/Telex 
2-Product Segment 
3-Geographic Segment 
4-Management Information 
5-Subsidiaries Information 
6-Future plans/Chairman or CEO’s Statement 
7-Number of Employees 
8-Fiscal Year-End 
B: Income Statement 
9-Consolidated Income Statement 
10-Cost of Goods Sold 
11-Complete Income Statement 
12-Sales 
13-Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 
14-Operating Income 
15-Foreign Exchange Gains/Losses 
16-Extraordinary Gains/Losses 
17-Income Tax Expense 
18-Minority Interest 
19-Net Income Reported 
C: Balance Sheet 
20-Complete Balance Sheet 
21-Current Assets Separated from Fixed Assets 
22-Current Liability Separated from LT Liability 
23-Owners’ Equity Separated from Liability 
24-Cash and Cash Equivalents 
25-Accounts Receivable 
26-Inventories 
27-Current Assets 
28-Fixed Assets on Asset Side 
29-Goodwill and Other Intangibles 
30-Shareholders’ Equity Changes 
31-Appropriation of Retained Earnings 
D: Funds flow / Cash flow 
32-Cash Flow Statement 
33-Complete Cash/Fund Flow Statement 
E: Accounting Policies 
34-Accounting Standards 
35-Financial Statements Cost Basis 
36-50% Long-Term Investments 
37-Starting Point for Funds Statement 
38-Research & Development Costs 
39-Pension Costs 
40-Reasons for Extraordinary Items 
41-Inventory Costing Method 
42-20% Long-Term Investments  
 
(continue) 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
43-21-50% Long-Term Investments 
44-Acquisition Method 
45-Accounting for Goodwill 
46-Deferred Taxes 
47-Outside Manager of Pension Funds 
48-Long-Term Financial Leases 
49-Foreign Currency Translation Method 
50-Foreign Currency Translation Gains / Losses 
51-Discretionary Reserves 
52-Minority Interest 
53-Contingent Liabilities 
F: Stockholders’ Information 
54-Dividend per Share 
55-Earnings per Share 
56-Number of Shares Outstanding 
57-Multiple Shares 
58-Par Value 
59-Total Dividends 
60-Stock Split / Dividend / Rights Issues 
61-Stock Price 
62-Stock Exchange Listing 
63-Volume Traded 
64-Diluted Earnings Per Share 
65-Changes in Capital 
66-Different Div. for Multiple Classes of Shares 
67-EPS for Multiple Classes of Shares 
68-Significant Shareholders 
69-Composition of Shareholdings 
G: Supplementary Information 
70-Earnings per Share Numerator 
71-Earnings per Share Denominator 
72-Notes to Accounts 
73-Disclosure of Subsequent Events 
74-Remuneration of Directors and Officers 
75-Research & Development Costs 
76-Capital Expenditure 
77-List of Board Members and Their Affiliations 
78-Exports; Financial Summary 
 
Removed from the scoring 
Funds Flow Statement 
Funds from Operations 
Funds Definition (Replaced by Cash Flow Statement) 
Quarterly/Interim Dividends (Dividends payed once a year) 
Separation of Non-Equity Reserves and Retained Earnings 
Total Assets Can Be Derived (Items outdated) 
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Appendix B: List of Discretionary Items considered in S&P-based Index 
Ownership Structure and Investor Relations (S&P Ownership) 
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose? 
1. The number of issued and outstanding ordinary shares disclosed? 
2. The number of issued and outstanding other shares disclosed (preferred, non-voting)? 
3. The par value of each ordinary share disclosed? 
4. The par value of each other shares disclosed (preferred, non-voting)? 
5 number of authorized but unissued & outstanding ordinary shares disclosed? 
6 number of authorized but unissued & outstanding other shares disclosed? 
7 par value of authorized but unissued & outstanding ordinary Shares disclosed? 
8 par value of authorized but unissued & outstanding other shares disclosed? 
9 top 1 shareholder? 
10 top 3 shareholders? 
11 top 5 shareholders? 
12 top 10 shareholders? 
13 description of share classes provided? 
14 review of shareholders by type? 
15 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 3%? 
16 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 5%? 
17 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 10%? 
18 percentage of cross-ownership? 
19 existence of a Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice? 
20 Corporate Governance Charter / Code of Best Practice itself? 
21 details about its Articles of Association. (e.g. changes)? 
22 voting rights for each voting or non-voting share? 
23 way that shareholders nominate directors to board? 
24 way shareholders convene an EGM? 
25 procedure for putting inquiry rights to the board? 
26 procedure for putting proposals at shareholders meetings? 
27 review of last shareholders meeting? (e.g. minutes) 
28 calendar of important shareholders dates? 
 
Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure (S&P Finance) 
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose: 
1 its accounting policy? 
2 the accounting standards it uses for its accounts? 
3 accounts according to the local accounting standards? 
4 accounts according to an internationally recognized accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
5 its balance sheet according to international accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
6 its income statement according to international accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
7 a basic earnings forecast of any kind? 
8 a detailed earnings forecast? 
9 financial information on a quarterly basis? 
10 a segment analysis (broken down by business line)? 
11 the name of its auditing firm? 
12 a reproduction of the auditors’ report? 
13 how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor? 
14 any non-audit fees paid to auditor? 
15 consolidated financial statements (or only the parent/holding co)? 
16 methods of asset valuation? 
17 information on method of fixed assets depreciation? 
18 a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake?     
 
(continue) 
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Appendix B (continued) 
 
19 a reconciliation of its domestic accounting standards to IAS/US GAAP? 
20 the ownership structure of affiliates? 
21 details of the kind of business it is in? 
22 details of the products or services produced/provided? 
23 output in physical terms? (number of users etc.) 
24 characteristics of assets employed? 
25 efficiency indicators (ROA ROE etc.) 
26 a discussion of corporate strategy? 
27 any plans for investment in the coming year(s)? 
28 detailed information about investment plans in the coming year(s)? 
29 an output forecast of any kind? 
30 an overview of trends in its industry? 
31 its market share for any or all of its businesses? 
32 a list/register of related party transactions? 
33 a list/register of group transactions? 
 
Board and Management Structure and Process (S&P Governance)  
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose: 
1 a list of board members (names)? 
2 details about directors (other than name/title)? 
3 details about current employment/position of directors provided? 
4 details about previous employment/positions provided? 
5 when each of the directors joined the board? 
6 classification of directors as an executive or an outside director? 
7 a named chairman listed? 
8 detail about the chairman (other than name/title)? 
9 details about role of the board of directors at the company? 
10 a list of matters reserved for the board? 
11 a list of board committees? 
12 the existence of an audit committee? 
13 the names on the audit committee? 
14 the existence of a remuneration/compensation committee? 
15 the names on the remuneration/compensation committee)? 
16 existence of a nomination committee? 
17 the names on the nomination committee? 
18 the existence of other internal audit functions besides the Audit Committee? 
19 the existence of a strategy/investment/finance committee? 
20 the number of shares in the company held by directors? 
21 a review of the last board meeting? (e.g. minutes) 
22 whether they provide director training? 
23 the decision-making process of directors’ pay? 
24 the specifics of directors’ pay (e.g. the salary levels etc.)? 
25 the form of directors’ salaries (e.g. cash, shares, etc.)? 
26 the specifics on performance-related pay for directors? 
27 the decision-making of managers’ (not Board) pay? 
28 the specifics of managers’ (not on Board) pay (e.g. salary levels etc.)? 
29 the form of managers’ (not on Board) pay? 
30 the specifics on performance-related pay for managers? 
31 the list of the senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)? 
32 the backgrounds of senior managers disclosed? 
33 the details of the CEO’s contract disclosed? 
34 the number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed? 
35 the number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers? 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for disclosure indices 
This table shows a descriptive statistics for the disclosure indices for the Portuguese and the Belgian samples. 
It also reports the t-test for equality of means. 
 
PORTUGAL BELGIUM 
CIFAR S&P CIFAR S&P 
 Mean 56.2 57.5 54.5 58 
 Median 57 59 56 58 
 Maximum 66 73 62 79 
 Minimum 39 28 41 40 
 Std. Dev. 5.7 9.5 5.5 8.2 
Q1 54 54 52 54 
Q3 59 65 58 61 
 
t-test for equality of means 
 
   
t  Sig.  
CIFAR (Portugal and Belgium) 1.988 * 0.053  
S&P (Portugal and Belgium) 0.534  0.596  
 
*  Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 2  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between CIFAR and S&P based indices 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between CIFAR and S&P indices for the Portuguese 
and Belgian markets. 
 
Countries N Correlation  
Both Portuguese and Belgian countries 90 0.4270 *** 
Portugal 45 0.4888 *** 
Belgium 45 0.3769 *** 
 
 ***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for independent variables 
This table reports some descriptive statistics for the independent variables. SIZE is computed as the 
logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt over total assets; PROFITABILITY is the 
return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before extraordinary items divided by book 
value of equity, relative to the ROE of the industry; AUDITOR is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if the company is audited by a Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise; EQUITY OFFER is a dummy variable that 
take the value one if the company arranged an equity offer during 2008, and zero otherwise; OWNERSHIP is 
determined by the voting rights of the three biggest shareholders of the company. Panel A presents our results 
and Panel B presents the results of Ding et al. (2008). 
 
 Panel A: Our study results 
Variable 
BELGIUM AND 
PORTUGAL PORTUGAL BELGIUM 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
SIZE 8.5482 0.7425 8.6081 0.7321 8.4883 0.7562 
LEVERAGE 0.6049 0.6735 0.7419 0.8995 0.4680 0.2647 
PROFITABILITY -27.5797 278.3622 1.1852 8.6101 -56.3446 393.6566 
AUDITOR 0.7556 0.4322 0.7333 0.4472 0.7778 0.4204 
EQUITY OFFER 0.0111 0.1054 0 0 0.0222 0.1491 
OWNERSHIP 0.6216 0.2125 0.6401 0.2035 0.6030 0.2219 
Panel B: Ding et al. (2008) results 
Variable 
BALTIC AND 
NORDIC REGIONS BALTIC REGION NORDIC REGION 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
SIZE 18.296 1.539 17.755 1.236 18.877 1.629 
LEVERAGE 0.452 0.200 0.391 0.210 0.517 0.166 
PROFITABILITY -0.008 0.237 -0.011 0.188 -0.004 0.282 
AUDITOR 0.850 0.363 0.840 0.368 0.850 0.361 
EQUITY OFFER 0.070 0.261 0.070 0.258 0.080 0.267 
OWNERSHIP 61.54 25.80 74.42 19.21 47.68 24.87 
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Table 4 
Correlation Coefficients of variables for both countries together 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the transparency coefficients for the two countries, the 
Portuguese coefficient and the control variables. SIZE is computed as the logarithm of total assets; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt over total assets; PROFITABILITY is the return on equity (ROE) of 
the firm, computed as the income before extraordinary items divided by book value of equity, relative to the 
ROE of the industry; AUDITOR is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is audited by a 
Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise; EQUITY OFFER is a dummy variable that take the value one if the company 
arranged an equity offer during 2008, and zero otherwise; OWNERSHIP is determined by the voting rights 
of the three biggest shareholders of the company. 
 
 
 
 
 ***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
 **  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
 *   Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
 
 
  CIFAR S&P PT SIZE LEVERAGE PROFITABILTY AUDITOR 
EQUITY 
OFFER 
PT 0.1329 -0.0195 
SIZE 0.3166*** 0.3811*** -0.0213 
LEVERAGE 0.0579 -0.0610 0.1619 0.1308 
PROFITABILITY 0.0757 0.0788 0.0971 -0.1413 -0.0209 
AUDITOR 0.2327** 0.2921*** -0.0380 0.4183*** -0.1376 -0.0543 
EQUITY OFFER 0.1255 -0.0215 -0.0992 0.1928* 0.0162 0.0127 0.0603 
OWNERSHIP -0.0773 -0.0219 0.1287 -0.1079 0.0174 0.2401** -0.0846 0.1643 
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Table 5 
Regression Results - Determinants of disclosure levels 
The table shows the OLS estimates of the transparency model, considering both the CIFAR and the S&P 
disclosure indices:  
iOwnershipOfferEquityAuditor
yofitabilitLeverageSizePortugalcyTransparen
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where PORTUGAL is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is Portuguese, and zero 
otherwise; SIZE is computed as the logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt over total 
assets; PROFITABILITY is the return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before 
extraordinary items divided by book value of equity, relative to the ROE of the industry; AUDITOR is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is audited by a Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise; 
EQUITY OFFER is a dummy variable that take the value one if the company arranged an equity offer during 
2008, and zero otherwise; OWNERSHIP is determined by the voting rights of the three biggest shareholders 
of the company, and µi,t is an error term. It presents the coefficient values, as well as the significance level. 
 
 
Variables 
  
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig.  Coef.   Sig. 
Intercept 38.6337 *** 0.0000  17.9955   0.1082 
PT 1.6990 0.1447  -0.3343   0.1082 
SIZE 1.9081 ** 0.0229  4.4684 ***  0.0014 
LEVERAGE 0.1784 0.8181  -1.0982   0.5765 
PROFITABILITY 0.0026 *** 0.0000  0.0043 ***  0.0000 
AUDITOR 1.6792 0.2203  2.8179   0.2457 
EQUITY OFFER 5.3569 *** 0.0013  -9.0155 ***  0.0003 
OWNERSHIP -2.8278 0.2204  0.7979   0.8416 
Adjusted R2   0.0894  0.1336 
N   90  90 
  
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Regression results – Effect of disclosure on stock price volatility 
The table shows the OLS estimates of the volatility model, considering both the CIFAR and the S&P 
disclosure indices:  
isIndFeffectDYieldMB
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where VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week share prices 
(annual volatility); TRANSPARENCY is a disclosure score based on one of two indices (CIFAR or S&P); 
SIZE is computed as the logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt over total assets; 
PROFITABILITY is the return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before extraordinary 
items divided by book value of equity, relative to the ROE of the industry; MB is the end-of-the-year 
capitalization divided by book value of total common equity; DYIELD is the dividend yield , computed as 
dividend per share divided by year-end stock price; INDFEFFECTS is the fixed effects for eight industry 
sectors and µi,t is an error term. Panel A presents the results for the Portuguese sample, and Panel B presents 
the results for the Belgian sample. Industry Fixed effects are included in the models. It presents the 
coefficient values, as well as the significance level. 
 
Panel A: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for Portugal 
 
Variables 
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Intercept        -7.6632*** 0.0044      -7.8163*** 0.0016 
TRANSPARENCY -0.0040 0.8906 0.0009 0.9687 
SIZE        1.0716*** 0.0003     1.0568*** 0.0010 
LEVERAGE 0.1049 0.5550 0.1132 0.5566 
PROFITABILITY 0.0587 0.5437 0.0125 0.4837 
MB 0.0587 0.2965 0.0571 0.3024 
DIVIDEND YIELD -8.9523 0.2333 -9.0057 0.2310 
Adjusted R2 0.2726 0.2721 
N 45 45 
(Continue) 
***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Regression results – Effect of disclosure on stock price volatility 
 
Panel B: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for Belgium 
Variables 
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Intercept 13.6295 0.7600 -9.1703 0.8142 
TRANSPARENCY -0.6641 0.1815 -0.4755 0.1691 
SIZE 1.8587 0.6727 3.4848 0.4559 
LEVERAGE 11.7928 0.3275 5.3431 0.6463 
PROFITABILITY 0.0267 0.4152 0.0250 0.4406 
MB 0.0319 0.4792 0.0289 0.5175 
DIVIDEND YIELD 53.4223 0.1161 64.7040 0.5557 
Adjusted R2 0.7858 0.7865 
N 45 45 
 
***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 7 
Regression results – Effect of Quarterly Reports disclosure on stock price volatility 
The table shows the OLS estimates of the volatility model, considering the CIFAR disclosure indices:  
isIndFeffectDYieldMByofitabilitLeverage
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where VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week share prices 
(annual volatility); TRANSPT1 is the CIFAR-based index with the use of first Quarterly Report; TRANSPS1 
is the CIFAR-based index with the use of first Half-year Report; TRANSP31 is the CIFAR-based index with 
the use of third Quarterly Report; TRANSPA is the CIFAR-based index with the use of Annual Report; SIZE 
is computed as the logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt over total assets; PROFIT 
is the return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before extraordinary items divided by 
book value of equity, relative to the ROE of the industry; MB is the end-of-the-year capitalization divided by 
book value of total common equity; DYIELD is the dividend yield , computed as dividend per share divided 
by year-end stock price; INDFEFFECTS is the fixed effects for eight industry sectors and µi,t is an error term. 
It presents the coefficient values, as well as the significance level. 
 
Variables 
CIFAR 
Coef.  Sig. 
Intercept -8.3583 * 0.0510 
TranspT1 -0.1731  0.2397 
TranspS1 -0.0344 ** 0.0486 
TranspT3 0.2005  0.1770 
TranspA -0.0110  0.6931 
SIZE 1.2795 *** 0.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.1466  0.4381 
PROFITABILITY 0.0091  0.6105 
MB 0.1524 ** 0.0243 
DIVIDEND YIELD -17.4694 ** 0.0410 
Adj. R2  0.3885 
N  42 
 
 ***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
 **  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
 *   Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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1
 See Lang and Maffett (2010) for a discussion of the literature reporting transparency and suggestions for 
future research. 
2
 The measures are dichotomous: we attribute the value of 1 if the information is disclosed in the firm’s 
Annual Reports, the value of 0 if the information is not provided, and we exclude the item if the disclosure of 
information is irrelevant and is not provided.  
3
 Purushothaman et al. (2000) analyse this ambiguity. They point that the leverage could leave to spread 
information in different ways because firms with higher levels of leverage will be nearest to their creditors, 
having different ways of divulging social responsibility.  
4
 Portugal is one of the countries of NYSE Euronext that is clear in need of research. 
5
 The high value of the adjusted R2 for the Belgian sample, which shows that about 78% of the variation of 
volatility is explained by the model, led to the investigation of the multicollinearity econometric problem. 
However, analysing the correlations matrix, there is no proving that multicollinearity is present in the model. 
Thus, this variation may be explained by the industry effects. 
 
